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Response

In Defense of Future Children: A
Response to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests
Kimberly M. Mutcherson†
Reproduction is a private affair and parenthood is its intense reward.
The reproductive drive needs to be tempered by the collective virtue
of human solidarity so the aspirations and rewards of having fine
children can be shared by everyone.1

INTRODUCTION
I. Glenn Cohen’s articles, Regulating Reproduction: The
Problem with Best Interests2 and Beyond Best Interests,3 are
well-argued pieces of legal scholarship written with the ambitious goal of “fundamentally re-writ[ing] the way we talk and
think about regulating reproduction.”4 It is a goal that Cohen
has pursued in a range of different pieces concerned with the
problems of reproduction in our complicated post-coital world.
In Beyond Best Interests, and its companion piece, he points to
the multiple examples of the use of an appeal to the best interests of the resulting child, or BIRC as he calls it, as a sufficient
basis for a range of intrusive interferences with and denials of
reproductive choice.5 He makes his case using examples ranging from criminal bans on brother-sister incest to similar bans
on the sale of sperm purchased from an anonymous source to
† For Max and Beanie, whom I loved before they were born. Copyright ©
2012 by Kimberly M. Mutcherson.
1. ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNING BABIES 241 (1999).
2. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011) [hereinafter Regulating Reproduction].
3. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187 (2012)
[hereinafter Beyond Best Interests].
4. Id. at 1274.
5. While much of the commentary in this response addresses the text in
Beyond Best Interests, the points made here are generally applicable to Regulating Reproduction as well.
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make a baby.6 He rejects BIRC as unsound largely because it
falls prey to Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem, which as Cohen succinctly describes it, holds that “we cannot be said to
harm children by creating them as long as we do not give them
a life not worth living.”7 Further, when we the law to intervene
in reproduction we also alter who gets made. In other words,
when we keep a woman from becoming pregnant at point A,
which would have resulted in the birth of child B, the child who
she bears at some later point will be child C. Therefore, it is
impossible in most cases for us to say that we have regulated
reproductive choice to change the future of one child except to
the extent that we have prevented that child from ever being
born.
Not only does Cohen reject BIRC because of its nonidentity implications, he further rejects a range of ways that
people might attempt to avoid the implications of BIRC. Rejected reformulations include those focusing on imperfect nonidentity problems meaning problems that will not necessarily
impact a whole population of future people who will never come
to be but some smaller slice of that population,8 or by focusing
on non-person affecting principles, which shift our analysis
from an individual child to broader conceptions of creating
more or less good in the world by reducing or replacing the
number of people who will experience more suffering or limited
opportunities.9 He then turns to dismantling other justificatory
regimes for reproductive regulation including concerns about
reproductive externalities, 3rd parties who will be harmed by
the births of particular children, and an argument based on the
idea that an act can be wrongful where there is harm even if
there is an overall benefit, such as a life worth living.10 He ends
by problematizing regulatory rationales based on legal moralist
concerns steeped in the idea that it is good to deter acts that
“undermine public morality” or virtue ethics concerns for the
6. As Cohen notes in Regulating Reproduction, the general convention is
to refer to men who sell their sperm in a booming commercial market as donors. See Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2. Bowing to this convention
perpetuates myths of altruism that ultimately mask commodification and
therefore make it more difficult for us to seriously consider the realities of a
market in making babies. Such a market clearly warrants serious and ongoing
consideration, therefore this response will dispense with using the word donor.
7. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 437.
8. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 457.
9. Id. at 481–482.
10. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1244.
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virtue of the parents or future parents who are making procreative of decisions.11 Here he points out that these rationales
may be masked by BIRC and that it is a good thing to get them
out into the open.12 He also argues that the virtue ethics approach may fall prey to the non-identity problem, therefore
making it illegitimate.13
The ultimate implication of Cohen’s work is that if the
BIRC rationale is bankrupt and actually masks a string of
problematic rationales for denying access to reproductive
choice, then the larger scholarly and policymaking conversation
about the regulation of reproduction needs to experience profound changes. He gives some concession to the idea that reproductive externality issues might warrant reproductive regulation, but only in a small number of cases.14 Further, he
asserts that if forced to argue based on true motivations, including in some cases a preference for heterosexist notions of
family life, those making such strong arguments for reproductive regulation might find themselves waging a much more uphill battle.15
Cohen’s work fits into a long and ongoing collection of
scholarly work about “whether, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.”16 These scholars of reproduction include many
people who share some of the scholarly commitments that appear to flow through Cohen’s work including grave concerns
about state attempts to regulate reproduction and the bioethical and legal scholarship that champions such a move.17 These
scholars have written extensively about ways in which the best
interests of the child rationale can and often has been used as
subterfuge for pernicious types of bias18 and, their writing on
11. Id. at 1265.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1269.
14. Id. at 1243.
15. Id. at 1266.
16. Id. at 1192.
17. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the
Reproductive Lives of Poor Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 609 (2009); Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother:
Why America's Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer—A Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389 (2009).
18. Though Cohen’s narrative does not focus on the best interest of the
existing child, it is worth noting that many scholars and activists have challenged the use of the best interest paradigm in the context of live children, as
juxtaposed against Cohen’s resulting children, because the test is subjective on
a level that can make it feel almost meaningless. See, e.g., Andrea Charlow,
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the myriad ways in which reproduction is a unique site for considering notions of human rights, dignity, and autonomy is illustrative of the core issues that are relevant when one writes
about the practice and regulation of having babies. When the
state regulates access to reproduction, and it does so in a range
of ways with disparate impacts on various populations, it strips
individuals of agency; it denies privileges of citizenship; and it
deprives people of dignity and human rights. When practiced
on a large scale, state sponsored reproductive control can have
profound impacts across a population. But even when practiced
on a small scale, the individual consequences for a person left
to ponder why the state is so appalled by the specter of her procreating that it would legislate against it has the potential to
be devastating. While not specifically articulated in this way in
Cohen’s writing, it is vital to ground this discussion in the seriousness of its ramifications and the often discriminatory ways
in which the power to regulate reproduction is wielded.
While there is much to appreciate in Cohen’s work, as a
whole it fails to attain his goal of fundamentally shifting the
terrain upon which discussions about exercising control over
reproduction takes place. This response offers four interrelated
observations about why Cohen’s work is ultimately unconvincing or less persuasive than it might otherwise be. First, his
work is rooted in the notion of procreation as substantially, and
perhaps strictly, a matter of rights and autonomy. That conversation ignores the ways in which such a narrow lens continuously fails to capture the complexities of the enterprise of creating new lives. An enterprise that necessarily involves some
consideration of consequences for those who already exist and
those who will exist. Second, Cohen’s work takes little account
of the fact that actively choosing to have children is a moral
choice and, as such, it is subject to condemnation, critique and
public scrutiny. Third, and this is the most important critique
and it is closely related to the first two, if we take Cohen at his
Awarding Custody: The Best Interest of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 272–273 (1987) (“Use of the indeterminate best interests
standard permits individual judges to ignore the results of scientific research
and to substitute their prejudices and values for those of legislatures . . . . [T]he current best interests standard provides too much latitude in
which judges can obscure the rationales for their decisions and allows them to
base custody awards on their personal values.”). See also, David L. Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 477 (1984).
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word that his piece is about shifting the conversation in the policy realm, his work substantially misses the proverbial boat.
There is no way that broad conversations about reproductive
regulation, and broad in this sense refers to conversations outside the confines of the insular world of academia, can or will
be conducted without some notion of the consequences that the
exercise of reproductive choice has on the lives of those children
who issue as a result of such choices. Fourth, and finally, the
real task of those of who find BIRC untenable is not to convince
others that it is unsound—philosophically or otherwise—but to
convince them that their notions of best interest are flawed.
This task is no doubt daunting, but the probability of success
on this account is substantially stronger than the probability of
convincing a range of decision makers that their resort to the
best interests of future children to rationalize action is and forever will be completely inadequate.19
I. JUSTICE AND RIGHTS OR JUSTICE, NOT RIGHTS
Crucial to this critique of Cohen is a broader framing of the
problem that he seeks to solve. In Cohen’s work, it is never
quite clear who exactly he is fighting for or why. To be sure, he
gives several specific examples of people who are subject to
regulation of their procreative choices, siblings in love among
them, but he never quite lays out why all of this matters in a
practical sense, though the answer to that is likely quite obvious to most readers. The primacy of the discussion about how
to regulate procreative choices, if at all, rests on very specific
ideas about procreation that merit ongoing exploration as they
are contested in academia and beyond. Cohen’s vision of why
this conversation matters appears to rest on his “modestly libertarian view” that “the State has to offer some justification for
limiting individuals’ reproductive choices . . . .”20 Specifically,
Cohen’s articles seem to take as unchallenged the premise that
the appropriate regime for worrying about issues of reproductive regulation is one that is rooted in the stand-alone notion of
reproduction as a right. Undergirding all of Cohen’s discussion
in Beyond Best Interests is an understanding of procreation as a
19. Throughout this response, I focus in particular on Cohen’s discussions
related to assisted reproductive technology (ART), as this is the area in which
I have been primarily focused for some years. I also believe that the ART arena sets up some interesting conflicts related to how reproduction may be perceived differently depending upon its context.
20. Regulating Reproduction, supra note 2, at 429.
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fundamental right as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Skinner v. Oklahoma.21 While it is uncertain whether that fundamental right extends to the use of ART, and this question is
disputed in the literature, there are certainly those who vigorously make this argument.22 Similarly, within the realm of ethics, there are those for whom procreation is a right, not a privilege, that is worthy of respect and protection, but that is also
subject to limits.23 The organizing framework of rights, however, is not uncontested territory. As a general matter, the debate
about rights as an organizing framework is not necessary to repeat here as it has been raging for far too long to be dismissed
as inconsequential.24 The field of advocacy related to reproduction has not been immune to this debate and its consequence is
that many of those who formerly considered themselves advocates for reproductive rights now proudly proclaim that they
are advocates for reproductive justice.25
The shift from rights to justice is an important one as notions of justice, especially as articulated by the reproductive
justice (“RJ”) movement, have long taken careful note of difference and offered multi-layered critiques of the relationship between reproduction and oppression in our divided and unequal
world. Cohen’s work takes no real account of the concept of re21. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1188 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
22. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Reproductive Rights and Reproductive
Technology in 2030, THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–18 (Jeffrey Rosen
& Benjamin Wittes eds.).
23. Laura Purdy explains, “Although there is no explicit constitutional
right to procreate, it is generally assumed that such a right is implied by other
fundamental constitutional rights. It is also assumed that it is, in any case,
morally justifiable to assert such a right, and that this right should be protected by law.” Laura M. Purdy, Loving Future People, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS,
AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, 301 (Joan C. Callahan ed.) (1995). See
also, Bonnie Steinbock, Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities, 24 HASTING’S CENTER REPORT 15 (2004) (discussing the contours of a right to procreative liberty and concluding that those without capacity to parent do not have a
right to reproduce).
24. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23
(1993) (describing the critical legal studies critique of the rights framework).
25. See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: DeConstitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L. J. 1394 (2009); Zenaida
Mendez, Reproductive Justice Is Every Woman's Right, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, http://www.now.org/nnt/fall-2006/reproductive_justice.html
(describing the National Organization for Women’s adoption of a resolution
“calling for a collaborative reproductive justice campaign that would ‘connect
the relevance of reproductive rights, health care and justice to the race and
ethnicity of all women, including women with disabilities.’”).
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productive oppression as an active and vital part of any conversation about the regulation of reproduction. To ignore both the
discriminatory nature of much of reproductive regulation, in
that it hits most deeply at traditionally disenfranchised groups,
and to not discuss the consequences that flow from treating access to reproduction in a cavalier or discriminatory fashion
leaves a big hole in this analysis.
To talk of justice rather than rights does not dismiss the
relevance of rights in the context of reproduction. Rather, the
reproductive justice narrative takes rights as necessary but not
sufficient for the purpose of freeing women and others from the
shackles of reproductive oppression.26 The goal of this movement is to ensure that all people have “the economic, social, and
political power and resources to make healthy decisions about
[their]bodies,
sexuality
and
reproduction
for
[them]selves . . . and [their] communities . . . .”27 Reproductive
justice advocates and scholars have long pondered the dangerous, pernicious, and oftentimes discriminatory ways in which a
professed concern for future children justifies a range of abuses
against the poor, people of color, those with developmental disabilities and other disenfranchised populations. Cohen makes
brief reference to forced sterilization of those with disabilities
and other types of reproductive wrongs,28 but reproductive justice scholars like Dorothy Roberts have long documented and
decried the reality of reproduction as a site for intersectional
oppression, especially for women of color, poor women, immigrants and others.29 They have also noted that in the case of
26. Reproductive oppression here refers to the multiplicity of ways in
which the ability to reproduce has served as a site of public control over the
lives of individuals, especially women. This oppression comes in the form of
reduced access to the tools of avoiding pregnancy, as well as sterilization
abuse, criminalization of actions taken while pregnant, reduction in access to
abortion services, and discrimination in employment based on pregnancy or
reproductive capacity.
27. A New Vision for Advancing our Movement for Reproductive Health,
Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Justice, FORWARD TOGETHER, http://
forwardtogether.org/assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf .
28. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1192.
29. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Betsy Hartmann, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL
(1995); Sarah Smith Kuehnel, Abstinence-Only Education Fails African American Youth, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1241 (2009); Alexandria Walden, Abortion
Rights for ICE Detainees: Evaluating Constitutional Challenges to Restrictions
on the Right to Abortion for Women in ICE Detention, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 979
(2009).
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children of color and poor children, professed concern for the
best interests of future children so often seems to end soon after those children leave their mother’s wombs.30 This last point,
which starkly ties together the two strands of best interest of
the child, has strong political resonance—-a resonance that
would get lost if one simply jettisoned the best interests discussion from all interactions related to reproduction.
This information about reproductive justice is relevant for
a few reasons. First, it highlights that the population for whom
Cohen’s arguments are salient goes beyond brothers and sisters
interested in pursuing sexual relationships with each other or
post-menopausal women who desire to have children or even
same-sex couples who want to create families with children. In
fact, those individuals are probably a tiny fraction of the people
for whom reproductive oppression is of primary concern. The
collection of individuals, especially women, for whom a critical
understanding of the role played by the BIRC trope in policymaking and legal analysis is broad, diverse, and often times politically weak.
Second, a justice lens, in contrast to a rights lens, tells
complicated stories about identity and imagines a diverse range
of interests related to reproduction that are both individual and
community oriented. For instance, the justice lens is firmly
rooted in the concept of intersectionality, which takes as its
starting point the understanding that overlapping identities
have profound implications for how one moves through the
world.31 A justice lens does the critical work of highlighting the
reality that procreation has been and well into the future will
continue to be a place where deep fears about race, gender,
sexual orientation, and class privilege play themselves out on
bodies that are largely female. As such, BIRC is not just about
the who, what, and when of procreation. It is profoundly and
disturbingly about staking out claims of worthiness, about who
deserves to be a full and complete member of the polity, and the
30. According to the Children’s Defense Fund, each day in America: 2
mothers die in childbirth; 5 children are killed by abuse or neglect; 5 children
or teens commit suicide; 8 children or teens are killed by firearms; 80 babies
die before their first birthdays; 949 babies are born at low birthweight; 2,058
children are confirmed as abused or neglected; 2,163 babies are born without
health insurance; and 2,573 babies are born into poverty. Each Day in America, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND (July 2011), http://www.childrensdefense.org/
child-research-data-publications/each-day-in-america.html.
31. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
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meanings of citizenship and human dignity. What is at stake
when one contemplates the role of BIRC in discussing reproduction is very much the stuff of life. Even more though, the
community element of the justice narrative suggests that discussions about procreation are not simply about a contest of
clashing rights and radical autonomy involving atomistic individuals, but also involve questions of interdependence, obligation, and relationship.32 For those who believe that these ideas
of connection and obligation are central to talk about reproduction, even if the conclusions that we draw from this insight are
different than those drawn by others, there is an obligation to
talk frankly about how and why those potential connections or
possible obligations do not dictate a single answer to how people should or should not pursue procreation.
II. HAVING CHILDREN IS A MORAL CHOICE
Also largely missing from Cohen’s work is clear acknowledgement that having children is a choice fairly subject to an
ethical analysis that has policymaking implications. This seems
like an especially relevant point in an article that substantially
concerns itself with philosophy and ethics so that if it is a philosophical argument that lays the foundation for rejecting a particular regulatory regime, other philosophical arguments may
be relevant to the discussion as well. As described above, Cohen
ascribes to himself a modestly libertarian view about human
reproduction. It is not incompatible with such a view to have
deep respect for private choices related to reproduction, while
being cognizant of the fact that procreation is in the public interest and there are public interests in procreation such that
the choice to procreate can raise serious public concerns that
justify the existence of public discussion though not necessarily
public control. This means that any veil of privacy surrounding
procreative choice can be pierced. Individuals and those who
govern them have obligations to generations that follow and
opting to create life is not an ethically neutral transaction. As
the philosopher Laura Purdy contends, the fact that one has
serious misgiving about and finds unjustifiable most limits on
individual reproductive behavior does not mean that “there are
32. The concept of relational autonomy does some of the work of describing how one can subscribe to notions of autonomy that do not depend on the
concept of disconnect. See, e.g., RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie &
Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
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no moral limits on reproduction.”33 Put another way, “exercising your legal rights can sometimes be morally wrong.”34 No
doubt, the space between public concern and public control is
frequently bridged and describing ways of maintaining that
space without denying the legitimacy of public concern is a consistent theme in the scholarship of reproduction.
While Cohen’s philosophical leanings lead him to the conclusion that the non-identity problem makes it impossible to
justify reproductive regulation based on the interests of future
children, one can legitimately conclude that reproduction without serious thought toward future children is morally suspect.
Again from Laura Purdy: “If we are consistent in our concern
about human happiness, it seems clear that we must attend to
the welfare of future people,”35 which, in Purdy’s case, means
rejecting the implications of Parfit’s non-identity problem. In
part she does so by casting some doubt on the idea of what it
means for a different person to exist from each new meeting of
sperm and egg.36 Further, she argues that the highly abstract
examples offered by Parfit37 coupled with a narrow focus on
harming
individuals,
“as
opposed
to
states
of
harm[] . . . implicitly promotes an unattractive ethic of moral
minimalism that could hardly be distinguished from libertarianism.”38 She concludes:
The underlying moral principle here seems to be that it is morally
permissible to bring you to life as long as you can be expected to find
your life worth living, because you are not thereby harmed (even if
you have been born in a harmed state) and it is permissible to do anything that does not harm you. What we owe others is thus reduced to
not harming them, and the standard for not having harmed them is
set very low. Generalizing these principles to other cases would lead
to a great deal of misery.39

Purdy’s rejection of the implications of Parfit is important
because it shows us one way out of the non-identity problem

33. Purdy, supra note 23, at 301.
34. Id. at 302.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 314.
37. Christine Overall also critiques Parfit’s and others’ chosen hypotheticals, noting “examples of women who happily or at least indifferently contemplate giving birth to suffering children are scarcely believable.” CHRISTINE
OVERALL, WHY HAVE CHILDREN?: THE ETHICAL DEBATE 151 (Arthur Kaplan
ed., 2012).
38. Id. at 316.
39. Id. at 316–317.
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and exposes the moral limits of non-identity as a baseline for
considering procreative choice.
In a similar vein, in her book, WHY HAVE CHILDREN?,
Christine Overall ponders why it is that people are often called
on to justify why they are childless, but are much less frequently asked why they have opted to have children.40 In part it
might be because having children is considered part of fulfilling
a biological destiny, an inadequate argument in Overall’s estimation,41 but she argues that questions about having children
are both prudential and ethical as:
[T]hey are about whether to bring a person . . . into existence—-and
that person cannot, by the very nature of the situation, give consent
to being brought into existence. Such questions therefore profoundly
affect the well-being both of existing persons (the potential parents,
siblings, grandparent, and all the other people with whom the future
child may interact) and potential persons.42

She goes on to note that procreative decisions have profound impacts on children, no doubt, and significant implications for communities. Overall also rejects Parfit’s framing of
identity in a way that inexorably and conveniently leads to his
non-identity problem. She believes that the relevant identity
category is not that of the child produced by the joining of a
particular egg and a particular sperm. Rather, citing to Sim
Vehmas, Overall argues that the relevant data point is the
identity of the child vis a vis that child’s “social place” in the
family.43 In other words, what matters from the perspective of a
parent is whether the child is the first child, second child, etc.
and this identity category is not determined by what sperm and
egg combination comes together at any point in time.44 If Overall is right, then the non-identity problem is not really a problem at all, but I suspect that Cohen does not believe that Overall is right.
Cohen’s response to all of this is probably that Overall and
Purdy are falling into the same philosophical fallacy that so
many have entered before them, but after making that claim
one needs to be prepared to offer some alternative account of
40. This freedom from being asked to justify one’s choice to parent tends
to be reserved for those deemed to be good parents worthy of procreation. So it
is the case that procreation pursued by single women, same-sex couples, lowincome people and other categories of reproductive outsiders is often met with
derision instead of delight. OVERALL, supra note 34.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 152.
44. Id. at 153.
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why procreation and procreative choice are matters worth ethical inquiry. It is not clear if Cohen would take the unequivocal
position that the interests of future children are unknown, unknowable, and unworthy of reflection unless the life to be lived
would not be worth living. If he did, such a position dismisses a
critical conversation that goes to the heart of the procreative
discussion. One need not be pro-life in the political sense in order to believe that matters of life merit both public and private
care and concern. Assuming that Cohen believes that this is
true, how he would articulate and justify such care and concern
without reference to future children or to reproductive externalities that offer no account of anything substantive being
owed to future people, but that focus instead on the interests of
the already living? In other words, if we jettison BIRC, as Cohen suggests, what remains to anchor any public concerns
about procreation other than the slim tether of reproductive externalities? More important, what remains to obligate the state
in positive ways to provide services to those who procreate?
III. BIRC IS HERE TO STAY
Despite Cohen’s quest to ensure that “never again will policymakers, courts, and legislatures defend the regulation of reproduction on grounds of children’s best interest or child welfare,”45 it is certain that BIRC will remain a cornerstone of
policymaking regarding reproduction for decades to come. If
Cohen’s goal was simply to engage in debate with other scholars, he can claim to have successfully continued the quest to
chip away at or at least expose the difficulties inherent in presuming to consider the interests of a person not yet conceived.
However, as Purdy and others have indicated, Parfit’s nonidentity problem is not without its holes that make it a less
than optimum theory of the morality of procreation.46 Even Cohen’s claim that courts have already taken up some elements of
non-identity through jurisprudence on wrongful life claims, in
which a child with a disability claims his existence as an injury
worth compensation because of a negligent failure to give his
parents information that would have led them to abort him,
45. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1274.
46. See, e.g., James Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804
(1986); Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A
Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1989); Jeffrey Reiman,
Being Fair to Future People: The Non-Identity Problem in the Original Position, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 69 (2007).
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has some holes.47 After all, wrongful life claims seem to go
hand-in-hand with wrongful birth claims so that a court has
the easy exit of allowing parents to recover for the negligent
denial of making a choice to abort without explicitly ruling on
whether the child’s life is worth living.48 But where there is no
companion wrongful birth claim, at least one court has determined that a wrongful life claim could stand, thus suggesting
that the calculus being done by these courts is a bit more complex than Cohen admits.49 This further intimates that the story
about wrongful life claims and non-identity that Cohen offers is
more complicated and will resonate in the BIRC debate far into
the future.
This persistence of the debate about BIRC in the literature
(after all, Parfit threw down the gauntlet of non-identity in
1984) speaks to the larger point here, which is about the rhetorical staying power of BIRC and Cohen’s ambition, which
goes beyond the community of scholars. Whatever their
strengths, these articles will not put a nail in the coffin of the
use of BIRC. This has nothing to do with the power of the argument. Instead, it is because Cohen does not successfully capture the extent to which BIRC is an expression of a larger and
intuitively persuasive view of the basic requirements of human
goodness and a prerequisite to many accounts of human flourishing and human obligation. This goes to the points that Cohen makes at the end of Beyond Best Interests in which he discounts the contribution of virtue ethics to the discussion of the
47. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1213.
48. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (1986) (rejecting wrongful life
claim but embracing wrongful birth claim).
49. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (1984). Furthermore, when courts embrace wrongful birth while rejecting wrongful life, they convince themselves
that in so doing they have avoided embracing the idea of a life not worth living. In fact, though, those wrongful birth claims, while given a different conceptual cloak, rest on the premise that potential parents would have deemed
their now living disabled child to have a future not worth living and would
have terminated that fetus in utero had they been presented with accurate
and timely information. In some very real sense, vindicating the right of the
parent to make reproductive decisions with full information premised on circumstances that lead to the birth of a child with disabilities whose presence is
a harm to her parents who would have avoided her birth is tantamount to saying that the child’s life was one not worth pursuing and not worth living. This
in substance is the crux of a wrongful life claim. Plus, one wonders whether
there is much difference between being told that one’s life is not worth living
versus being told that one is not worth parenting. All of this is to say that the
message that courts send when they embrace wrongful birth and sanctimoniously reject wrongful life is fuzzy.

2012]

IN DEFENSE OF FUTURE CHILDREN

59

regulation of reproduction. Virtue ethics refers to branch of ethical thought that concerns itself with the virtue or moral character of an actor rather than the consequences of an act or the
duties or rules that inspire a particular action. Within Cohen’s
account, virtue ethics has the benefit that it can, if wielded correctly, circumvent the non-identity problem because it does not
rely on any reference to the well-being of a future child, but only the moral character of the parent or potential parent.50 In
other instances, though, where a reference to the moral virtue
of a parent measures that virtue in part by reference to the
flourishing of a future child, non-identity once again rears its
head.51
But, Cohen may be too quick to reject the insights of virtue
ethics or the extent to which this branch of inquiry closely
tracks the root of much policymaking. Title notwithstanding,
BIRC is not solely about a child and it certainly need not be reduced to any given child and any given set of parental decision
makers. Instead, it is a stand in for a larger conversation about
the nature of reproductive responsibility, a concept certainly as
slippery and malleable as the concept of the best interests of a
(real or imagined) child. The logical fallacy of BIRC is not wholly relevant to the bigger conversation which BIRC raises which
is under what conditions is it responsible for a person to procreate? No doubt there are many who would say that there is
no objective answer to this question, and Cohen notes that part
of the problem of virtue ethics is that people will and do propose dueling ideas about what is means to act virtuously as a
future parent. Within the policy arena smart people consistently engage in this inquiry and make policies based on the conclusions that they draw. For some policymakers, it is not responsible to have a child while one is receiving public
assistance and the right policy move is to cap benefits for families receiving such assistance so that the aid flowing to the family will not increase if a child is born while that family is receiving government aid.52 The interests of children, present and
future, is central to the debate surrounding such caps as is a
baseline concern about how policy can and should be used to
50. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1270.
51. Id. at 1271.
52. See, e.g., Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.F GENDER & L. 151,
152 (2006) (noting that as of her writing, 22 states had family cap or child exclusion policies in place).
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trigger certain types of decisions by would-be parents on behalf
of would-be children.53 While people draw differing conclusions
about those interests, the idea that those interests are irrelevant to the conversation is not even entertained. Similar policy
examples abound, but they all boil down to the idea that a critical and foundational component of actively engaging in a decision to procreate is an assessment of the life that is being offered to a future person, as an individual, and to future people
in aggregate.
Reproductive responsibility and BIRC as some faction of
evaluating that responsibility is ubiquitous and it speaks to the
fact that BIRC is not strictly about logic or reason, but it resonates instinctively with people precisely because it takes seriously, as a normative matter, the idea that one can act wrongly
by procreating. Concomitant with this belief for many people is
one that holds that the state has obligations to provide services
to better the conditions in which procreation happens. By this I
mean that people believe in the idea of BIRC because it fits
with an account that future people are owed some measure of
respect and that one who seeks to bring new life into the world
has obligations to that new life that begin at least at pregnancy
if not well before. It is because of BIRC that women begin to
take pre-natal vitamins while trying to become pregnant. It is
BIRC that drives families to move to bigger homes in good
school districts in anticipation of having a child. BIRC drives
future fathers to begin smoking cessation programs so that
they can become non-smokers before their future child is conceived. BIRC is the incentive for a woman living with diabetes
to get her disease under control before she attempts to become
pregnant.
The list of ways in which individuals and couples organize
their lives around the potential for potential life is staggering,
if not surprising. Similarly, as Cohen notes, there is law and
public policy aimed at future generations in explicit and implicit ways. Much of our governmental policy related to protecting
the environment hinges on a belief that we have obligations to
be good stewards of the earth for those who will inherit it long
after those of us alive today have shuffled off this mortal coil.
Cohen might argue that these efforts are for the benefit of
many and not one specific future person. Plus, our actions in
protecting the environment have real, tangible benefit for those
53. Id.
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alive today. But the point here is that choosing to create life is
an act with consequences. Some of those consequences are the
reproductive externalities that Cohen describes in his piece,
with a focus on so-called “cost-type externalities to third-parties
within a State,”54 but the most basic consequence of engaging
in a procreative act is that, when successful, such an act ends
in the arrival of a new human being. It is precisely because of
this simultaneously simple and complicated truth that BIRC is
here to stay. It is an intuitive, powerful and intractable political tool and one cannot jettison that tool without providing an
adequate account of what will replace it. Cohen offers no such
account here and no clear way forward to creating such an account.
Many people, policymakers among them, find it abhorrent
to argue that whatever acts one commits during the process of
creating new life are not wholly morally repugnant so long as
the life being brought into being is not without worth. It may be
that I am taking Cohen’s argument in a direction which he does
not intend, but it is not an illogical direction. In fact, from the
perspective of many laypeople, one comes to owe something to a
child to a significant degree well before a child or even a pregnancy comes to pass. This reality is substantially missing from
Cohen’s work and makes it seriously unlikely that it will resonate strongly in the policymaking arena. This lack of resonance
might be irrelevant, but based on Cohen’s stated goals, I think
it is not. Cohen argues that BIRC is a “non-starter,” “empty,”
and “misleading” and that it is used to “avoid [] confrontation
with justificatory idioms that are disturbing, controversial, and
illiberal,”55 but none of these things are necessarily true in an
objective sense. The BIRC idiom is in fact the most basic of
starting points for conversations about reproduction. Cohen’s
point is that it should not be, but that is a normative claim
whereas the claim in this response is descriptive. BIRC can
have serious content even if the content that it reveals is underneath its surface rather than on its face. That subsurface
content is not misleading to the extent that what it concerns itself with is seeking to get people and policymakers to take as
seriously the decisions that precede procreation as those that
follow. The idioms that justify these moves may be disturbing,
controversial and illiberal, but in many cases those disturbing,
controversial and illiberal arguments are being made in con54. Beyond Best Interests, supra note 3, at 1218.
55. Id. at 1189.
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junction with BIRC so it is inaccurate to say that BIRC is always a mask for something dark.56
As Cohen notes in his own piece, this belief in BIRC has
consequences in the law and policy arena. The power of the
state is brought to bear on women who pursue pregnancy in
spite of active use of illegal drugs.57 People seek to appoint a
guardian for a fetus when its mother is developmentally disabled and incapable of making her own decisions related to reproduction.58 The irony in the ART context is that the nonidentity problem protects the reproductive freedom of people
who may be more inclined than anyone to consider themselves
parents with parental obligations before a pregnancy is even
begun. Imagine the married couple, same-sex or opposite sex,
that begins discussing decorations for a nursery before even
hiring the surrogate that they will need to carry their future
child in her womb. In the end, many people, perhaps most, consider it anathema not to consider a child’s welfare in the process of preparing for that child’s conception and birth. Imagine
Cohen or Parfit in a room of “donor-conceived”59 children who
want answers about their genetic origins. Those young people
or adults would not be satisfied with a claim that reducing access to anonymity in the sale of sperm would have led to their
non-existence. By the same token, as people and policymakers
consider what changes technology has wrought on traditional
notions of family, there is a desire to cling to the preciousness
of genetic tie as a last bastion of normalcy. In that case, the
idea of severing that connection by allowing people to move
through the world without knowledge of their genetic origins
will strikes many as a denial of a basic human right and a
wholly preventable harm inflicted on future people.
56. For instance, Savulescu makes his disturbing argument about a duty
to enhance without subterfuge. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why
We Should Select the Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413 (2001).
57. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (describing and
finding unconstitutional a program at Medical University of South Carolina
that involved arresting women who gave birth while using illegal drugs).
58. Wixtrom v. Department of Children and Family Services (In re
J.D.S.), 864 So.2d 534 (2004) (court refused to appoint a guardian for the fetus
of a severely developmentally disabled woman).
59. Many of those who are the product of alternative insemination involving purchased sperm, some of whom also actively work against the practice of
anonymous sales of sperm within the fertility industry, use the term donorconceived to describe their provenance. See, e.g., http://donorconceived
.blogspot.com/.
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None of the preceding paragraphs should be read to reject
Cohen’s important contribution to the scholarly conversation
about the regulation of reproduction. In fact, in the ART context, academics would do quite well to heed his call to find other ways to describe and support efforts to push policymakers
toward more restrictive regulation of access to the tools of
babymaking because anything that makes people substantially
more conscious of the serious consequences of their advocacy in
this arena is a good thing. Many of those writing in this arena,
several of whom are cited in Cohen’s work, would argue that
there is no hidden agenda in their work that uses the idea of
best interests of the future child. For those authors, Cohen’s
work is a clear challenge and seeing how they respond to his
claims will be fruitful for this ongoing conversation.
It may be the case that none of the foregoing discussion
changes anything about what Cohen has written depending
upon how narrow his claim is. His claim might simply be that
policy and law cannot and should not be based on BIRC, or
even more narrowly, that criminal prohibitions should not be
premised on BIRC. More broadly, his claim could be that no decision-making can or should be based on the best interests of a
being not yet in existence. If his claim is the latter one, then it
is far too broad. By contrast, if it is the former then we are left
to ponder the justification for not extending the same claim to
individual decision-making. If it is wrong for the state or other
public bodies to act in the interest of that which does not yet exist because in so acting they change who will exist, that outcome would seem to be the same for an individual as well.
Once we extend the claim to individual decision making
things get really scary. While few people would endorse arresting pregnant women who smoke cigarettes, most people would
likely offer approval for public health officials advising pregnant women not to smoke. Further, most people would advise
close friends and family members not to smoke while pregnant.
A fair number of people would probably offer unsolicited advice
to a pregnant stranger encountered on the street about her
smoking habit. That advice would not be simply about reproductive externalities such as premature births or low birth
weight associated with children born to cigarette smokers. Instead, in advising a friend to kick her cigarette habit while
pregnant, one would do so in part to urge that friend to act in a
way that reflects some concern about the life in being that she
is choosing to carry to term.
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One might take the position that BIRC is always wrong or
should be abandoned, but one might also take the position that
wrong or not, BIRC is here to stay and that the fight, therefore,
is not about eliminating BIRC, but molding it so as to limit its
potential for harm. The challenge to Cohen, therefore, is to ask
him to consider whether in fact the proper route to change policy is to get people to abandon notions of BIRC or to reconfigure
their sense of what is in the best interest of a child not yet conceived or not yet born. This is a proposal about practicality and
feasibility rather than a proposal about supportable or insupportable philosophical claims because, again, even if his claims
are well-supported, though not universally embraced in the
scholarly literature,60 a good philosophical argument does not
always (or often) hold great sway in the legislature.
As any good politician would tell us, you do not win political battles by ceding all of the good rhetoric to the other side
and Cohen’s arguments allow for a wealth of rhetorical concessions. In a fight on the floor of a state legislature, on Cohen’s
side are those who do not care about the lives of future babies
and children. On the other side are those who do. On Cohen’s
side are those who would defend the rights of adults to have
babies over the rights of those babies to be cared for and cared
about prior to their birth and perhaps prior to conception. On
the other side are those who declare that procreation is a right
that brings with it enormous responsibilities that can and
should be enforced by the government. When the rhetorical
battle becomes between those who care about defenseless children and those who do not, it is hard to feel that one is on the
side of the angels if one does not side with the children. It is not
clear from Cohen’s paper how he would extricate himself from
this dilemma. None of this is meant to suggest that anyone who
believes in the non-identity problem must necessarily believe
that reproduction carries with it no responsibilities. But, to
that extent that they do stake a claim for reproductive responsibility they are obliged to offer a supportable basis for such a
claim that makes no reference to the actual people created from
reproductive acts.
IV. MAKING BIRC WORK
It may indeed be the case that BIRC is as bankrupt as Cohen argues, but it can simultaneously be the case that attempt60. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 23.
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ing to break its hold is a quest that is doomed to failure or one
that at least will take inordinate amounts of time to successfully pursue. In the meantime, as Cohen points out in his piece,
there are multiple scholars supporting an agenda of enhanced
regulation in the ART arena that could have potential negative
impacts on those who use ART to build families with children.
Rather than put forth a freestanding proposal about how to respond to these calls for regulatory action premised on BIRC,
this response simply make a few points about a possible way
forward.
A way of reconfiguring BIRC comes from the realm of existing pregnancy regulation. Consider a pregnant woman or a
woman eager to conceive who has some dangerous habits. Most
individuals would agree that a fetus is very poorly- served by a
pregnant woman or a soon to be pregnant woman who is an alcoholic who consistently drinks alcohol to excess or who has an
expensive heroin habit or who pops prescription pills like candy
while pregnant. Such women draw substantial ire from the
masses. Even women who have no illegal habits may find
themselves judged for their wish to procreate if they are living
with a profound disability or are living with a transmissible
disease like HIV or if they are simply low-income. For these
women, an extreme response to the idea of acting within the
best interest of a child could be to sterilize women without their
consent if there are serious concerns about their future parenting skills; or arrest pregnant drug-using women; or deny access
to fertility treatments for women living with disabilities. But,
one could also turn the conversation away from punitive
measures and instead imagine the ways in which the world
could be re-configured to provide better services so as to avoid
the need to punish. More treatment beds and less prison spaces
for people with substance abuse problems. Broad access to supportive services at a reasonable cost for people living with disabilities. Higher minimum wage, greater job training, better
public education. It is here that one has more than ample opportunity to expose the type of hypocrisy that Cohen fears lurks
in so many discussions about BIRC. There is always much hue
and cry about reproductive irresponsibility and such enormous
reluctance to take steps that create much more supportive circumstances in which people can make choices for themselves
and their families. In the act of highlighting that hypocrisy, we
might do more for changing the perception of what is appropriate regulation of procreative choice than we would by urging
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people to ignore or unlearn everything they have come to value
about what it means to procreate responsibly. Further, while
Cohen is most concerned with criminal sanctions, the implications of his position might include arguments against positive
attempts to influence reproductive decisions and create better
conditions in which people opt to procreate. To the extent that
his work would lead to conclusion in this vein that would be an
unfortunate and, I imagine, unintended consequence of his
work.
CONCLUSION
The push back articulated in this response has the potential to reinforce uses of state power that many, myself included,
find abhorrent. The goal here is not to buttress any foundation
for discriminatory and dignity reducing public intrusions into
private acts of procreation. But, to reject BIRC in a way that
has resonance, requires two things. First, it requires acknowledging the laudable goal that many individuals are pursuing
when they make reference to BIRC—-namely asking those who
have children to be ever mindful that procreation has power
and therefore brings with it serious responsibility. In conjunction with this sense of private responsibility, BIRC asks the
state to act in positive ways to create conditions under which
children and families can both survive and thrive. Both of these
goals can be used to justify extreme and discriminatory legislation, but they can also be used to justify goods like better enforcement of environmental standards, increased access to job
training, and more availability of contraceptives. Any or all of
these policy moves accrue to the benefit of existing and future
people. Second, it requires offering some alternative formulation to BIRC that allows policymakers to continue to consider
that which makes the procreative act unique and what makes
ART unique is that it is the only thing that we do that creates
new human beings. And while it may seem quaint in an era of
16 and Pregnant to imagine that there is something special
about making a baby—-a world in which we no longer believe
that procreation matters, to those who procreate and those who
are made, is truly bankrupt.

